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Abstract 
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing enterprises during 
1999-2005, which accounts for over 90% of China’s industrial output, and 
robust econometric procedures we show that the Chinese banking system has 
helped to support the growth of both firm value added and TFP.  We find 
that access to bank loans is positively correlated with future value added and 
TFP growth.  We also find that firms with access to bank loans tend to grow 
faster in regions with greater banking sector development.  While the effects 
of bank loans on firm growth are more pronounced in the case of purely 
private-owned and foreign firms, they are positive and statistically significant 
even in the case of state-owned and collectively-owned firms.  We show that 
excluding loss-making firms from the sample does not change the qualitative 
nature of our results.  
 
JEL classification: E44, O53 
 
Keywords: Chinese banking system development, value added and TFP 
growth, panel dataset.  
 
4 February 2008 
                                                 
∗  We acknowledge financial support from the ESRC under the World Economy and Finance Research Programme 
(Award RES-156-25-0009).  We have benefited from comments participants at the “Finance and Development” 
conference at the London School of Economics, 26-28 June 2007.  Special thanks to our discussant, Sonja Fagernas, 
for her constructive and thorough comments and to Badi Baltagi and Stijn Claessens for their helpful suggestions in 
the earlier stages of this work.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
China offers a most interesting and possibly unique setting in which to examine 
the relationship between finance and growth, utilising firm-level data, for (at 
least) three compelling reasons, which are as follows:  
(i) China is one of the most important and fastest-growing economies in 
the world.  Almost 30 years of rapid economic growth – in itself an 
unprecedented phenomenon - has transformed China from an 
agricultural economy to the factory of the world; from a closed 
economy into the world’s largest exporter of textiles, toys, laptop 
computers, cell phones, digital cameras, etc. and the 2nd largest FDI 
recipient country.  As a result, China now has the largest volume of 
foreign reserves in the world, as well as one of the largest banks (the 
ICBC).  Therefore, examining the role played by the finance-growth 
mechanism within China is interesting in its own right and could 
therefore make a useful contribution to the finance-growth literature. 
(ii) The Chinese banking system has been dominated by state-owned 
banks and is widely regarded of very poor quality by international 
standards (e.g. Allen et al, 2005).  The mainstream view in the 
literature is that government-owned banks are inefficient and 
motivated by political objectives.1 China’s banking sector has 
accumulated huge amounts of bad loans, not least because one of its 
major responsibilities has been the bailing out of financially 
distressed state owned enterprises.  Furthermore, it has been argued 
that the Chinese banking sector is regionally segmented, that 
financial resources are not mobile and that they are allocated 
inefficiently (Young, 2001; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Allen et al 
(2005) have, therefore, argued that because of its inefficient banking 
system, China represents an important counter example to the 
apparent consensus that a well-developed financial system is 
                                                 
1 See, however, Andrianova et al ( 2008) for a critique of this view.  
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necessary for growth.2  Based on this view, one might therefore 
expect that the finance-growth mechanism would be weak, if present 
at all, in the case of China.   Allen et al (2005) in fact ascribe Chinese 
economic growth to informal financial channels than the formal, 
state-dominated, financial system.3  
(iii) Increased data availability over recent years means that finance-
growth type questions can now be examined using very large micro 
data sets.  In this paper we utilise a very large micro panel data set 
that spans the entire Chinese manufacturing industry which contains 
detailed information on firms' sources of financing.  Our dataset 
includes 1.3 million observations that cover the period 1999-2005; by 
2005 a quarter million firms are included.  The firms in our sample 
account for nearly 90% of total industrial output in China.4   
This paper, therefore, utilises a very large micro dataset of Chinese firms to 
examine the contribution of bank finance to the growth of firm value added and 
total factor productivity, controlling for firm characteristics and ownership 
structure. The results of our investigation are therefore likely to have important 
policy implications, not only for China but also for other developing and 
transition economies in which state-owned banks and enterprises are 
prominent.  
Our main finding is that, contrary to what might be expected from a state-
dominated, inefficient banking system, the finance-growth mechanism in China 
has been alive and kicking.   Specifically, we find that access to bank loans is 
                                                 
2 For recent surveys of the finance and growth literature see Demetriades and Andrianova 
(2005) and Levine (2003). 
3There is, however, a parallel literature which explains how China’s regional decentralization 
contributed to the success of Chinese economic reforms and thus to economic growth (e.g. Qian 
and Xu, 1993). Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have been provided that regional 
decentralization created incentive conditions for regional competition which fosters regional 
economic growth (Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000; Li and Zhou, 2006).  Moreover, it is argued that 
Chinese regional decentralization creates conditions for experimenting reform policies. This 
contributes substantially to the success of reforms and growth (Qian, Roland and Xu, 2006). 
 
4 For comparison purposes it should be noted that Allen et al (2005) use a dataset of 1100 listed 
firms during the period 1992-2000. 
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positively correlated with future value added and TFP growth. Moreover, we 
find that firms with access to bank loans tend to grow faster in regions with 
greater banking sector development.  While the effects of bank loans on firm 
growth are more pronounced in the case of privately owned and foreign firms, 
they are positive and statistically significant even in the case of state-owned and 
collectively- owned firms.  Our findings - which challenge the Allen et al (2005) 
view on the role of the Chinese banking system - are nevertheless broadly 
consistent with the findings of a recent macro-econometric study by Rousseau 
and Xiao (2007); these authors provide evidence using aggregate data and time-
series econometric methods which suggests that banking sector development 
during 1995-2005 played a central role in China’s economic growth during that 
period.    
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the dataset and variable 
construction.  Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and the 
empirical model.  Section 4 presents the empirical results while section 5 
summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Data and variable construction 
The main source of our data is the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China (various 
issues), covering the population of Chinese state-owned manufacturing 
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with annual turnover of more than 
5 million RMB Yuan (about $620,000). The sample accounts for nearly 90% of 
total industrial output.5 The dataset, which we have collected for the period 
1999-2005, contains detailed information on output, assets, sources of finance, 
exports, sales, value added, employment, wages, R&D expenditure, product 
innovation and employee training outlay, as well as ownership structure, 
industry affiliation, and geographical location.6  Other data sources include 
                                                 
5 This figure is calculated using China Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 
6 The data are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook (2000-2003). 
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China Statistical Yearbook, China Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook and China 
Financial Statistics.  
We provide detailed information on the dataset structure in Appendix 1 Tables 
A1-A3.  Table A1 presents the frequency distribution of firms during the sample 
period, showing that the number of firms almost doubled during the sample 
period.  Tables A2 and A3 show the industrial classification and geographical 
distribution of firms, respectively, confirming that the dataset exhibits 
reasonable sectoral and geographical balance.   
 
2.1 Classification of firm ownership type 
Officially, firm ownership type in China is classified according to the 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of 
Registration of Corporate Enterprises. This classification has been questioned 
recently (e.g. Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei, 2007), given ownership changes among 
Chinese enterprises in various forms have happened during the reform years.  
We therefore create our own, data driven, ownership classification utilising the 
rich information provided in the dataset, which includes the share of equity 
capital contributed by the state, collective investors, domestic private and 
foreign investors.  Specifically, we classify firms as state owned enterprises 
(SOE) if the share of state capital in total equity is 50% or higher; collectively 
owned enterprises (COE) if the share of collective capital in total equity is 50% 
or higher; foreign owned enterprises (FOR) if the share of foreign capital (incl. 
capital from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and foreign countries) is 50% or 
higher; domestic private enterprises (Private): all remaining enterprises. The 
latter group is further classified into three sub-types:  
(i) Private with state capital (Private_state): if the share of state capital is 
greater than zero (but less than 50%); 
(ii) Private with foreign capital (Private_for): if the share of foreign 
capital is greater than zero (but less than 50%); 
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(iii) Pure private (PPrivate): the rest of the firms (i.e. those without state 
or foreign capital). 
The dataset structure in terms of firm’s ownership is summarized in Appendix 
Table A4.  Private firms represent 62% of the sample; of these, pure private 
firms constitute more than half the sample (54.2%).  There are only a relatively 
small number of private firms with state capital (1.6%) and a somewhat larger 
number of private firms with foreign capital (6.5%).  SOEs represent 11.7% of 
the sample during the entire period, but this average figure masks a declining 
trend reflecting privatisation of state owned firms.7 The remaining two 
categories are COEs, which account for 12.40% of the sample, and foreign 
invested firms, which represent 16.0% of the sample; the majority of foreign 
invested firms are owned by Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwanese investors. 
 
2.2 Variable construction and summary statistics 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the estimations 
for the overall sample and also by ownership type.  The total factor productivity 
(TFP) measure is estimated following the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003), which is outlined in Appendix 2. This approach has been widely applied 
in recent literature because of its advantage of being able to control for the 
simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity 
shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or electricity) 
as proxies. For all firms, the average TFP growth reaches 8.5% over the sample 
period, with a high standard deviation indicating large heterogeneity among 
firms8.  There is an on average 12.4% of industrial value added growth over the 
period 1999-2005, again with the highest growth among pure private domestic 
firms, followed by foreign firms. The high standard deviations suggest a 
substantial variation among firms.  The average firm age is approximately 10 
                                                 
7 The percentage of SOEs has dropped through time from 28% in 1999 to 6% in 2005.  
8 Note that we have adopted the improved capital stock measurement suggested by Jefferson et al (2000), 
at the price of losing one year observations. As such, the calculated TFP is the average growth rate of the 
TFP over 2000-2005.  
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years, with loss-makers being older on average, 14 years. The average firm size 
in the sample, measured as the logarithm of total employment, is 4.907 (equal to 
297 employees). We measure firm’s access to formal finance by the logarithm of 
the amount of bank loans obtained by the end of each period. The average level 
of bank loans is 1.004 (equal to RMB Yuan 2,481,300, or approximately 
US$300,000). The average level of equity finance is 3.596 (equal to RMB Yuan 
16,027,000, or approximately US$1,931,000). There are several indicators at 3-
digit SIC industry level used in our analysis. Exit rate at industry is the 
percentage of firm exit in each year. On average the exit rate among Chinese 
firms is 17.6% over the period of 1999-2005. PRIVY, measured by regional 
aggregate bank loans issued to private sector over regional GDP, is to capture 
the degree of regional financial development. It is proved to be a reasonable 
measure by previous finance-growth literature (see Levine 2005).  
 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
In order to evaluate the extent to which the Chinese banking system promotes 
firm growth, we specify an empirical model in which access to formal finance 
can influence firm performance over and above non-financial factors such as 
firm age, size, industry etc.   Specifically, our model is as follows.     
itittijitititit DEQUITYFDBANKBANKXY εβββββ +++++′= −−− 51,4013121 )*(          (1)    
The dependent variable Yit represents either total factor productivity or value 
added growth for firm i at time t.  BANK it-1 denotes the stock of bank loan 
liabilities of firm i outstanding at time t-1; EQUITYit-1 denotes the total amount 
of equity finance invested in firm i at time t-1.  Xit is a vector of control 
covariates, Dit is a vector of dummies, including various fixed effects, and εit is a 
random error term.  
Entering equity finance alongside bank loans in the empirical model helps to 
ensure robustness in that the estimated coefficient is more likely to capture the 
effect of bank loans, as opposed to the effect of another omitted formal finance 
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channel, with which bank finance may be correlated.9 Moreover, it allows a 
comparison of the differential impact of bank and equity finance, which can 
provide additional insights into the finance-growth nexus within China.   
Both finance variables are lagged by one period to control for potential 
endogeneity. Bank loans or equity finance may be correlated with unobserved 
shocks to firm performance, hence using contemporaneous values may result in 
biased estimates.  By making the finance variables predetermined, one potential 
source of bias is therefore removed.  However, even if the estimated coefficients 
turn out to be positive, it does not follow that the correlation between bank 
loans and firm performance can be interpreted causally i.e. getting a bank loan 
isn’t necessarily the reason why a firm grows faster.  Indeed, economic analysis 
suggests that even if banks are able to pick winners – i.e. firms with profitable 
opportunities – through effective screening of loans applicants, it does not mean 
that the bank loans they provide cause them to grow faster.  Bank loans simply 
enable firms to exploit profitable opportunities. Whether causal or not, a 
positive correlation between (lagged) bank loans and firm performance would 
suggest that Chinese banks are carrying out their screening function effectively.  
Hence, if such a positive correlation is found, we could legitimately conclude 
that Chinese banks are at the very least supporting or facilitating the growth of 
firms.     
We shed more light on the finance growth nexus in China, by interacting BANK 
with an indicator of initial financial development in the region in which a firm 
is based (FDj0, where j represents the region).  This allows us to examine 
whether regional financial development mediates the growth enhancing effects 
of access to bank finance.  The finance and growth literature suggests that the 
impact of banks on firm performance is likely to be larger in more financially 
developed countries (and consequently regions). This is because banks are more 
likely to have greater expertise in monitoring and screening loan applicants in 
more financially developed countries (or regions), hence they would channel 
                                                 
9 The qualitative nature of the results is unaltered even if we exclude equity finance.   
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loans into the more productive firms.  Consequently, if this term is found to be 
positive and significant, it would suggest that the standard finance and growth 
mechanism is operational within China.  We use the initial level of financial 
development to address possible reverse causality between regional financial 
development and firm performance.  It is not impossible that some regions may 
become more financially developed because they have a large number of fast 
growing firms.  By using the initial level of the financial development indicator, 
which is interacted with lagged bank loans, we are avoiding any 
contemporaneous correlation between this composite variable and unobserved 
shocks to firm performance.  
Besides equity finance, the empirical model includes a vector of other control 
covariates, Xit, hypothesised to impact on firm growth.  These controls include 
linear and squared terms of (initial) firm size and age.  They also include the 
initial level of TFP or value added which is included to capture convergence; a 
negative coefficient would indicate that a part of firm growth in value added 
represents catch-up from a low initial value.  Hence, we expect this term to be 
negative.  The vector Dit consists of a full set of firm ownership, industry and 
regional dummies, since it is important to control for the possibility that these 
fixed characteristics affect firm performance.  In addition it also includes time 
dummies, to remove the effects of temporal shocks that affect all firms, as well 
as time dummies interacted with region dummies to remove the possible 
influence of any regional fixed effects that vary with time, such as changing 
regional economic policies.   
Since the growth variable is only observed for firms that have survived, it is 
important to correct for selection bias due to firms’ survival.  A popular method 
for correcting selectivity bias is to apply the technique due to Heckman (1976).  
However, this technique is not appropriate in panel data models like ours – see 
Equation (2).  Wooldridge (1995) shows that in such cases, Heckman’s method 
leads to inconsistent estimates and proposes more appropriate methods for 
testing and correcting for sample selection bias in these models.  We therefore 
utilise Wooldridge’s techniques to test for and correct the selectivity bias that 
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may arise due to firms’ survival in our data set.  The variables we include in the 
selection equations are quadratic terms of size and age, productivity, industry 
concentration and industry entry and exit rate.  These are standard variables 
used in the firm survival literature (e.g. Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Mata et 
al., 1995). 
The Wooldridge estimator starts by estimating for each time period t=1, 2, …T 
the selection equation by standard probit.  Next,  it obtains the inverse Mills 
ratio for surviving firms, say , and defines the  matrix of inverse Mills ratios, 
say , as 
itλˆ
itΛ ( )00ˆ00 itit λ=Λ .  The selection bias corrected estimates can 
then be obtained by estimating the baseline model (Equation 1) augmented 
with the matrix of inverse Mils ratios (the correction terms).  That is 
itititjitititit DFDBANKBANKXY εγββββ +Λ++++′= −− 4013121 )*( .                   (2)       
A test for the joint significance of the correction terms provides a test for sample 
selectivity. 
To summarise, our empirical strategy is robust to a wide range of possible 
econometric issues that may arise when using panel data sets of the type we are 
using in this paper.  Specifically, we have taken steps to address (i) possible bias 
due to sample selection relating to firm survival, (ii) potential endogeneity of 
regressors through the use of lagged finance and by controlling for various 
fixed effects, including any time varying regional factors, (iii) potential 
endogeneity problems related to the measurement of TFP via the Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) method (see Section 2.2.). 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
The main empirical results are presented in Tables 2-5.  Tables 2 and 3 contain 
the estimates of the determinants of TFP growth while Tables 4 and 5 contain 
the estimates of the determinants of value added growth.  Tables 3 and 5 
include the interaction term between regional financial development and bank 
loans in the list of regressors while tables 2 and 4 do not.  
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We first examine the results in Table 2.  To start with, the selection test in all 
columns validates the use of the Wooldridge estimation method. Column (1), 
which contains the overall results, shows that ownership matters for TFP 
growth, with all ownership types having higher TFP growth than the 
benchmark group, which corresponds to state-owned firms.  This is certainly a 
very plausible result, given that state owned firms are unlikely to be at the 
forefront of innovation.  What is a little surprising is that the highest group in 
terms of TFP growth are not foreign firms but pure private (domestic) firms, 
followed by collectively owned enterprises and private (domestic) firms with 
some foreign capital.   The initial level of TFP enters with a negative and 
significant coefficient, suggesting convergence is taking place, albeit at a fairly 
slow speed – its coefficient is -0.14.  The other controls enter with plausible 
coefficients.  Access to bank loans enters with a positive, albeit small, coefficient 
that is highly significant, while equity finance enters with a substantially higher 
positive coefficient that is also highly significant.  Columns (2)-(7) in the same 
table contain the results for different ownership types.  Both bank loans and 
equity finance have positive and highly significant coefficients for all ownership 
types.  Both finance variables have the highest coefficients in the case of foreign 
owned firms, followed by pure private (domestic) firms.  Bank loans have the 
smallest coefficients in the case of private firms with state capital followed by 
collectives and state owned firms.  These results suggest that the finance-
growth mechanism works better in the case of privately owned firms but it is 
not absent even in the case of state owned firms. 
The results in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2, except for the coefficient of 
bank loans which is now much lower and is no longer significant for all 
ownership types.  However, the newly introduced interaction term is positive 
and highly significant throughout Table 3.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that the Chinese banking system has a positive influence on TFP 
growth and that on the effects of bank loans are amplified by the state of 
regional financial development. Firms with identical characteristics, including 
the same access to bank loans, will grow faster if they are located in regions that 
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are more financially developed.  Given that this effect is over and above any 
(time-varying) regional effects, we can conclude that it is not simply capturing 
changes in regional economic policies.  Conversely, the positive and significant 
coefficient of this interaction term also suggests that regional financial 
development has a bigger positive impact on TFP growth in those firms that 
borrow more from banks.   
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the same exercise as Tables 2 and 3 but with firm value 
added growth as the dependent variable instead of TFP growth.  Controlling for 
initial industrial value added level, the conclusions that can be drawn by 
examining the estimated coefficients are broadly very similar to those that can 
be drawn from Tables 2 and 3.   The interaction term now enters with 
substantially higher coefficients relative to the corresponding terms in Table 3, 
suggests that regional financial development has quantitatively larger effects on 
firm value-added growth than on TFP growth.   
The results in Tables 2-5 provide very clear evidence that even in the overall 
sample, which includes state-owned enterprises, the finance-growth 
mechanism in China is both alive and kicking.  Importantly, our evidence 
suggests that the growth-finance mechanism in China does not merely reflect 
the effects of financial development on capital accumulation – financial 
development seems to have a positive effect on TFP growth.   
 
Loss making enterprises and the finance-growth mechanism 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of re-estimating our main model after 
removing loss-making firms from the sample.  Loss making enterprises 
represent 14% of firms in our sample, and 27% of state-owned firms.  It may be 
argued that bank lending to loss-making enterprises, particularly state-owned 
ones, is politically motivated, since state-owned banks, which dominate China’s 
banking system, may be required by the government to keep alive firms that 
serve political objectives.  If this were true, it would undermine banks’ ability to 
finance productive enterprises and we would therefore expect to see higher 
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coefficients on the bank loan variable and its interaction with regional financial 
development if loss-making enterprises were removed from the sample.  On the 
other hand, if lending to loss making enterprises is dictated by economic 
criteria, particularly the future prospects of these firms, removing these firms 
from the sample should not alter the results very much.  This is because loss-
making firms that receive bank loans would be the ones whose future prospects 
are bright, as it would not make any commercial sense for banks to make loans 
to loss-making firms who are unlikely to be able to repay the loans in the future.    
Tables 6 and 7 show that in the overall sample, the coefficient on bank loans is 
somewhat higher than the corresponding one in Tables 3 and 5, respectively.  
This change is, however, non-negligible only in the industrial value added 
comparison where the coefficient on bank loans rises from 0.0026 to 0.0042, with 
the increase being slightly more than two standard errors. The coefficient of 
bank loans becomes significantly positive for pure private domestic firms in 
Table 7 in comparison to Table 5, suggesting profit-making firms benefit from 
bank loans; for SOE and private with state capital, the coefficients remain 
insignificant but are more positive; while profit-making foreign firms have 
higher significantly positive coefficients. The coefficients of the interaction term 
of bank loans and financial development show a minor. Thus, it appears that 
excluding loss-making firms from the sample increases the direct effect of bank 
loans on industrial value added growth but mitigates their effect through 
regional financial development.  Interestingly, this overall result does not reflect 
changes in the coefficient of bank loans for state owned enterprises, but the 
coefficients on collectives and private firms.  By removing loss making 
enterprises from the sample, this coefficient switches from insignificant to 
significant in the cases of collective enterprises and pure private (domestic) 
firms.  Once again the coefficient of the interaction term declines but remains 
significant in the case of all ownership types.    
We can, therefore, conclude that removing loss-making enterprises from the 
sample does not alter the qualitative nature of the results very much at all.   
These findings seem to tentatively suggest that politically motivated lending to 
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loss making firms in China is not as widespread as it is perhaps believed to be.   
In order to explore this issue in more depth, we ran the TFP growth regressions 
on loss making firms alone.10   In the overall sample, the effect of both bank 
loans and the interaction term remains positive and significant, suggesting that 
the banking system continues to have a positive impact even on loss making 
firms.  However, the results by type of ownership show that this effect varies 
widely between private and state-owned enterprises.  The relevant coefficients 
are positive and significant at the 1 per cent level for pure private firms and 
foreign owned firms; they are positive and significant at the 5 per cent level for 
collectives.  When it comes to state-owned enterprises, the effect of bank loans 
is significant only at the 10 per cent level while the interaction term is not 
significant.  Finally, when it comes to private firms with some state capital, both 
the relevant coefficients are insignificant.  These results seem to suggest that 
banks may be able to turn around loss-making firms as long as they are not 
wholly or partially government owned.   Thus, there appears to be some 
evidence to suggest that lending to loss-making enterprises in which the 
government has an ownership stake may indeed be politically driven.  Aside 
from these firms, however, our findings on all other types of firms suggest that 
the finance and growth mechanism in China is operating reasonably well, 
notwithstanding the close ties between banks and political authorities.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Our empirical results suggest that the view that China’s banking system has 
been an idle or even disruptive participant in the process of Chinese economic 
growth is not supported by the empirical evidence.  Our paper certainly adds to 
the growing body of evidence which suggests that in fact the Chinese banking 
system played a central role in supporting economic growth (see also Rousseau 
and Xiao, 2007).   We believe this is not only an interesting finding but also a 
comforting one.  It is clearly interesting to confirm that the finance-growth 
                                                 
10 These results are not reported in a separate table to save space.   
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mechanism is present, even in a country with state dominated banks; this result 
casts further doubt on the critics of government ownership of banks (see also 
Andrianova et al, 2008).  It is very comforting because the silent implication of 
the view that Chinese economic growth had nothing to do with China’s banks 
suggests that Chinese economic growth could have been even higher had the 
banking system been more supportive.  This is certainly an implication that is 
not only hard to swallow, given the very high growth rates already achieved, 
but also a disturbing one for the world economy: could it have coped with even 
higher growth rates in China?  
Our empirical findings, robust as they may be, raise an important question that 
warrants further investigation: what is the mechanism that helps to ensure that 
a state-dominated banking system chooses to finance productive privately 
owned firms?  We believe the answer to this question may be found by 
examining the role of regional governments in Chinese economic growth and 
the links of these governments with regional banks.  There is already an 
important literature which emphasises the contributing role played by China’s 
regional decentralization to the success of Chinese economic reforms and thus 
to Chinese economic growth (e.g. Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin, Qian and Xu, 
2000; Li and Zhou, 2006; Qian, Roland and Xu, 2006).  What remains to be 
explored in future research are the precise linkages between regional 
governments and regional banks and their implications for the lending 
behaviour of banks.    
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Appendix 1: Dataset structure 
 
Table A1: By year 
year Freq. Percent 
1999 116,902 10.01 
2000 125,210 10.72 
2001 140,985 12.07 
2002 152,419 13.05 
2003 169,447 14.51 
2004 236,413 20.24 
2005 226,400 19.39 
Total 1,167,776 100 
 
Table A2: By 2-digit SIC industrial classification 
2-digit sic industry Freq. Percent 
13-Food Processing            67,842  5.81 
14-Food Production            28,768  2.46 
15-Beverage Industry            20,079  1.72 
16-Tabacco Industry              1,594  0.14 
17-Textile Industry          101,583  8.7 
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products            58,700  5.03 
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products            28,373  2.43 
20-Timber Processing            22,860  1.96 
21-Furniture Manufacturing            13,179  1.13 
22-Papermaking and Paper Products            36,546  3.13 
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction            26,656  2.28 
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods            15,263  1.31 
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking              8,474  0.73 
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
           85,816  7.35 
27-Medical products            24,727  2.12 
28-Chemical Fibre              5,955  0.51 
29-Rubber Products            13,967  1.2 
30-Plastic Products            54,445  4.66 
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products          104,809  8.98 
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals            27,375  2.34 
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous 
Metals 
           20,910  1.79 
34-Metal Products            63,332  5.42 
35-Ordinary Machinery            86,415  7.4 
36-Special Purposes Equipment            48,087  4.12 
37-Transport Equipment            53,764  4.6 
39-Other Electronic Equipment             69,192  5.93 
40-Electrical Equipment and Machinery            36,201  3.1 
41-Electronic and communication appliances            16,382  1.4 
42-Meters and office appliances            26,482  2.27 
Total       1,167,776  100 
 
 
 16
Table A3: By province 
Region Freq. Percent 
11- Beijing 28,562 2.45 
12- Tianjing 26,610 2.28 
13- Hebei  45,695 3.91 
14- Shanxi 14,772 1.26 
15- Neimenggu 6,700 0.57 
21- Liaonign 39,445 3.38 
22- Jilin 9,594 0.82 
23- 
Heilongjiang 
13,478 
1.15 
31- Shanghai 71,099 6.09 
32- Jiangshu 161,446 13.83 
33- Zhejiang 165,630 14.18 
34- Anhui 24,126 2.07 
35- Fujian 46,308 3.97 
36- Jiangxi 17,999 1.54 
37- Shandong 103,964 8.90 
41- Henan 55,475 4.75 
42- Hubei 36,434 3.12 
43- Hunan 31,366 2.69 
44- Guangdong 155,574 13.32 
45- Guangxi  15,517 1.33 
46- Hainan 2,395 0.21 
50- Chongqin 12,380 1.06 
51- Sichuan 29,926 2.56 
52- Guizhou 9,186 0.79 
53- Yunnan 9,382 0.80 
54- Xizang 1,023 0.09 
61- Shaanxi 12,404 1.06 
62- Ganshu 11,373 0.97 
63- Qinghai 1,558 0.13 
64- Ningxia 2,409 0.21 
65- Xinjiang 5,946 0.51 
Total 1,167,776 100.00 
 
Table A4: By ownership defined according to capital structure 
Ownership Freq. Percent 
State-owned enterprises (SOE) 141,123 12.08 
Collective enterprises (COE) 146,147 12.51 
Private enterprises: 725,293 62.11 
           -Domestic private enterprises (Private_state) 28,463 2.44 
           -Pure Private (PPrviate) 632,607 54.17 
           -Private with foreign capital (Private_for) 64,223 5.50 
Foreign invested enterprises  (FOR) 155,213 13.29 
Total 1,167,776 100.00 
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Appendix 2:  TFP estimation method 
 
The total factor productivity (TFP) measure is estimated following the 
methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies 
in controlling for the simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and 
unobserved productivity shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as 
raw materials or electricity) as proxies.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t is: 
ititittitl
itititkitlit
mkl
kly
εφβ
εωβββ
++≡
++++=
),(
0                  
where y is log of value added, which is sales net intermediate inputs (m), l is 
labour input and k is capital input, and  ),(),( 0 ititititkitittt mkkk ωββωφφ ++=≡  
is an unknown function of capital and intermediate inputs. tφ is strictly 
increasing in the productivity shock , so that it can be inverted and one can 
write 
itω
),( itittit kmωω =  for some function tω . Levinshon and Petrin (2003) 
approximate ),( ititt mkφ  by a third order polynomial in k and m,  
and obtain and estimate of 
s
it
j s
j
itjs mk∑∑
=
3
0
3 δ
lβ  and tφ  (up to the intercept) via OLS. This 
constitutes the first stage of the estimation procedure. At the second stage the 
elasticity of capital kβ  is defined as the solution to 
, where ( )2*ˆmin
* ∑∑ −−−
i t
ititkitlit kly
k
ϖββ
β it
ϖ  is a nonparametric approximation 
[ 1| −ititE ]ωω . Since the estimators involve two stages the calculations of the 
covariance matrix of the parameters must allow for the variation due to all of 
the estimators in the two stages. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) note that the 
derivation of the analytical covariance matrix is quite involved, and suggest the 
bootstrapping procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 200 
bootstrap replications are performed. Once consistent estimates of the input 
elasticities are derived, the log of productivity can be obtained as 
.   itkitlitit kly ββω ˆˆˆ −−=
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The data of industrial value-added and intermediate input are deflated by ex-
factory price indices published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). 
The fixed assets data are deflated by fixed asset price indices published in the 
China Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook and Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-
2006). The estimation has been conducted by 2-digit SIC industry categories. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 All enterprises (1) SOE (2) COE Private (6)Foreign 
Variables      (3)Private with 
state capital 
(4)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(5)Private with 
foreign capital 
  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
TFP level 1.549 2.209 0.970 3.073 1.518 1.957 1.562 1.949 1.631 1.965 1.724 1.825 1.736 2.446 
Growth of TFP (gTFP) 0.085 0.637 0.004 0.737 0.039 0.631 0.051 0.633 0.117 0.600 0.081 0.600 0.098 0.676 
Industrial value-added level (log term) 3.871 1.393 3.463 2.020 3.743 1.192 4.631 1.664 3.791 1.202 4.351 1.344 4.345 1.355 
Growth of industrial value-added (gIVA) 0.124 0.74 -0.001 0.828 0.057 0.691 0.068 0.685 0.165 0.725 0.116 0.687 0.139 0.777 
BANK, log of bank loans 1.004 1.72 1.910 2.187 1.131 1.653 2.010 2.300 0.846 1.552 0.958 1.770 0.576 1.460 
Equity, log of equity finance 3.596    1.596 3.603 1.916 3.155 1.338 4.902 1.784 3.243 1.394 4.260 1.397 4.646 1.447 
Size (log of total employment) 4.907 1.124 5.043 1.492 4.775 1.022 5.490 1.273 4.618 1.004 5.101 1.074 5.126 1.113 
Age 10.299 11.065 21.929 17.014 13.499 11.304 13.842 13.565 7.827 8.596 7.960 5.934 7.107 3.996 
Exit rate at 3-digit SIC industry level 0.176 0.054 0.247 0.235 0.244 0.235 0.260 0.258 0.385 0.359 0.322 0.321 0.356 0.349 
PRIVY, financial development indicator, 
regional aggregate bank loans to private 
sector over regional GDP in 1999. 
0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 
Percentage of observations (%) 100 - 12.08 12.51 2.44 54.17 5.50 13.29 
 
Table 2: Access to bank loans and firm TFP growth 
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.0108*** 0.00944*** 0.00852*** 0.00654** 0.0100*** 0.0139*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.00048) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.00092) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0391*** 0.0367*** 0.0174*** 0.0483*** 0.0407*** 0.0311*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.00080) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0057) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0028) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0226*** 0.0445*** -0.0658*** -0.0113 -0.0227*** -0.0206 -0.0923*** 
 (0.0071) (0.017) (0.016) (0.034) (0.0085) (0.027) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.0494 -0.349** 0.200 -0.122 0.0268 0.0576 0.678*** 
 (0.067) (0.15) (0.16) (0.30) (0.089) (0.24) (0.15) 
Age 0.0959*** 0.0634** 0.166*** 0.0675 0.132*** -0.00277 -0.163*** 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.020) (0.050) (0.012) (0.036) (0.054) 
Age2 -0.714*** -0.411 -1.538*** 0.305 -1.255*** 2.094*** 4.469*** 
 (0.17) (0.57) (0.39) (0.95) (0.22) (0.73) (1.12) 
Initial TFP level -0.136*** -0.123*** -0.153*** -0.122*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0069) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.0862***       
 (0.0044)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0694***       
 (0.0078)       
Pure domestic 
private 
0.107***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0872***       
 (0.0053)       
Foreign 0.0801***       
 (0.0052)       
Constant 0.0172 -0.203*** 0.0230 -0.160 0.0329 -0.0825 0.666*** 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.073) (0.13) (0.054) (0.099) (0.21) 
Observations 436564 54240 60253 12671 217561 28848 62991 
R2 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.11 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
4743.37; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1291.36; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1723.13; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
352.31; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
2861.16; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1456.83; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
874.49; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Access to bank loans, TFP growth and regional financial 
development 
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00410*** 0.00541*** 0.00118 0.00188 0.00331*** 0.00674*** 0.00735*** 
 (0.00063) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.00088) (0.0024) (0.0021) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999
 
1.160*** 
 
0.649** 
 
1.475*** 
 
0.682* 
 
1.149*** 
 
1.153*** 
 
1.328*** 
 (0.049) (0.29) (0.24) (0.38) (0.072) (0.17) (0.22) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0389*** 0.0359*** 0.0179*** 0.0489*** 0.0399*** 0.0301*** 0.0556*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0025) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0305*** 0.0361** -0.0758*** -0.0213 -0.0259*** -0.0226 -0.0918*** 
 (0.0062) (0.014) (0.016) (0.031) (0.0078) (0.024) (0.017) 
(Initial size)2 0.110* -0.292** 0.283* -0.0447 0.0532 0.0714 0.670*** 
 (0.062) (0.13) (0.17) (0.28) (0.079) (0.22) (0.19) 
Age 0.102*** 0.0712*** 0.170*** 0.0772* 0.131*** -0.000977 -0.161*** 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.019) (0.045) (0.013) (0.034) (0.044) 
Age2 -0.812*** -0.554 -1.574*** 0.159 -1.222*** 2.093*** 4.449*** 
 (0.17) (0.46) (0.38) (0.85) (0.23) (0.73) (0.92) 
Initial TFP level -0.136*** -0.124*** -0.156*** -0.122*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.010) (0.0028) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
Ownership 
dummy 
       
COE 0.0843***       
 (0.0048)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0691***       
 (0.0073)       
Pure private 0.105***       
 (0.0040)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0877***       
 (0.0050)       
Foreign 0.0820***       
 (0.0051)       
Constant -0.0699 -0.228*** -0.0461 -0.189 0.0424 -0.0772 0.660*** 
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.056) (0.13) (0.062) (0.099) (0.21) 
Observations 436564 54240 60253 12671 217561 28848 62991 
R2 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.11 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
5248.72; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1328.54; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1934.19; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
652.37; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
3001.90; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1625.07; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
974.36; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Access to bank loans and firm IVA growth 
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.0133*** 0.00795*** 0.0114*** 0.00318 0.0134*** 0.0171*** 0.0175*** 
 (0.00047) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.00079) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0662*** 0.0471*** 0.0257*** 0.0638*** 0.0736*** 0.0642*** 0.0822*** 
 (0.00085) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0027) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0287*** 0.0522*** -0.130*** -0.0311 -0.0271*** -0.0442** -0.0894*** 
 (0.0053) (0.014) (0.016) (0.035) (0.0085) (0.021) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.605*** -0.236* 0.957*** 0.144 0.815*** 0.730*** 1.141*** 
 (0.056) (0.14) (0.17) (0.31) (0.091) (0.20) (0.14) 
Age -0.0425*** -0.0335 0.108*** -0.0190 -0.0107 -0.205*** -0.677*** 
 (0.0087) (0.029) (0.021) (0.043) (0.012) (0.040) (0.049) 
Age2 1.806*** 1.193** -0.385 1.913** 1.570*** 6.015*** 16.11*** 
 (0.13) (0.52) (0.40) (0.79) (0.20) (0.87) (1.05) 
Initial IVA level -0.241*** -0.148*** -0.193*** -0.143*** -0.302*** -0.234*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.010) (0.0028) (0.0056) (0.0049) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.146***       
 (0.0044)       
Private with state 
capital 
 
0.127*** 
      
 (0.0052)       
 
Pure private 
 
0.168*** 
      
 (0.0039)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
 
0.166*** 
      
 (0.0054)       
Foreign 0.148***       
 (0.0041)       
Constant -0.580*** -0.755*** -0.545*** -0.680*** -0.397*** -0.483*** 0.498** 
 (0.039) (0.072) (0.065) (0.13) (0.060) (0.099) (0.20) 
Observations 640657 68159 79481 15920 350854 38635 87608 
R2 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.15 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2523.29; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
929.88; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
398.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1289.48; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
869.23; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1373.27; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1307.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Access to bank loans, IVA growth and regional financial 
development 
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00262*** 0.00302 0.00339 -0.00226 0.00144 0.00586*** 0.00559*** 
 (0.00062) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.00099) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999
1.985*** 0.998*** 1.733*** 1.004*** 2.141*** 1.813*** 2.319*** 
 (0.049) (0.23) (0.27) (0.31) (0.081) (0.17) (0.27) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0650*** 0.0469*** 0.0250*** 0.0635*** 0.0721*** 0.0626*** 0.0812*** 
 (0.00079) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0027) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0316*** 0.0496*** -0.132*** -0.0330 -0.0304*** -0.0461** -0.0883*** 
 (0.0054) (0.016) (0.017) (0.037) (0.0088) (0.021) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.628*** -0.220 0.968*** 0.156 0.840*** 0.740*** 1.124*** 
 (0.059) (0.14) (0.17) (0.31) (0.099) (0.20) (0.17) 
Age -0.0407*** -0.0326 0.110*** -0.0180 -0.0103 -0.203*** -0.671*** 
 (0.0099) (0.027) (0.020) (0.050) (0.012) (0.031) (0.044) 
Age2 1.801*** 1.186** -0.414 1.911** 1.607*** 6.044*** 16.04*** 
 (0.14) (0.49) (0.37) (0.91) (0.21) (0.67) (0.84) 
Initial IVA level -0.242*** -0.148*** -0.193*** -0.144*** -0.303*** -0.236*** -0.242*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0023) (0.0065) (0.0048) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.147***       
 (0.0037)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.126***       
 (0.0057)       
Pure private 0.169***       
 (0.0034)       
Private with 
foreign capital
0.167***       
 (0.0038)       
Foreign 0.151***       
 (0.0043)       
Constant -0.583*** -0.755*** -0.550*** -0.680*** -0.396*** -0.486*** 0.479** 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.053) (0.12) (0.055) (0.076) (0.21) 
Observations 640657 68159 79481 15920 350854 38635 87608 
R2 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2809.11; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1026.03; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
708.23; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1387.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1024.51; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1409.21; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1327.78; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
        
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Access to bank loans, TFP growth and regional financial 
development among profit-making firms  
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00449*** 0.00427* 0.00211 0.00367 0.00373*** 0.00802*** 0.00926*** 
 (0.00071) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999
 
1.108*** 
 
0.601** 
 
1.403*** 
 
0.578 
 
1.103*** 
 
1.171*** 
 
1.054*** 
 (0.062) (0.27) (0.24) (0.38) (0.074) (0.15) (0.27) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0368*** 0.0270*** 0.0179*** 0.0444*** 0.0394*** 0.0279*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0024) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0231*** 0.0460** -0.0837*** -0.00772 -0.0154 -0.00701 -0.0719*** 
 (0.0064) (0.020) (0.019) (0.041) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016) 
(Initial size)2 0.0663 -0.339* 0.385** -0.123 -0.00116 -0.0598 0.487** 
 (0.069) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) 
Age 0.0796*** 0.0850*** 0.136*** 0.0676 0.109*** -0.0163 -0.156*** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.026) (0.048) (0.014) (0.040) (0.058) 
Age2 -0.298* -0.621 -0.683 0.452 -0.811*** 2.570*** 4.287*** 
 (0.18) (0.56) (0.52) (0.92) (0.24) (0.82) (1.56) 
Initial TFP level -0.129*** -0.112*** -0.157*** -0.118*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0099) (0.0029) (0.0060) (0.0069) 
Ownership 
dummy 
       
COE 0.0772***       
 (0.0049)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0615***       
 (0.0077)       
Pure private 0.0980***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0776***       
 (0.0047)       
Foreign 0.0657***       
 (0.0055)       
Constant -0.0495 -0.318*** 0.0186 -0.219 0.0693 -0.135 0.515** 
 (0.053) (0.064) (0.071) (0.16) (0.074) (0.094) (0.22) 
Observations 342657 30912 47618 9346 182016 23720 49045 
R2 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.13 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
4319.02; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1244.06; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1703.28; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
873.09; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
2720.18; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1332.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
764.31; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Access to bank loans, IVA growth and regional financial 
development among profit-making firms 
 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00420*** 0.00363 0.00552** 0.00169 0.00334*** 0.00669*** 0.00781*** 
 (0.00065) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.00098) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999
1.879*** 0.806** 1.617*** 0.852* 2.032*** 1.785*** 1.955*** 
 (0.064) (0.32) (0.21) (0.44) (0.083) (0.16) (0.26) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0639*** 0.0466*** 0.0245*** 0.0565*** 0.0709*** 0.0574*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.00084) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0064) (0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0025) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0256*** 0.0795*** -0.122*** -0.0143 -0.0293*** -0.0247 -0.0664*** 
 (0.0059) (0.021) (0.018) (0.042) (0.0073) (0.020) (0.016) 
(Initial size)2 0.623*** -0.367* 0.911*** 0.0291 0.891*** 0.538*** 0.874*** 
 (0.065) (0.19) (0.18) (0.36) (0.081) (0.20) (0.17) 
Age -0.0421*** 0.0177 0.0834*** -0.00635 -0.0191* -0.182*** -0.606*** 
 (0.0094) (0.030) (0.019) (0.054) (0.011) (0.037) (0.049) 
Age2 2.088*** 0.414 0.388 1.919* 1.916*** 5.866*** 14.66*** 
 (0.15) (0.53) (0.38) (0.98) (0.21) (0.78) (1.10) 
Initial IVA level -0.241*** -0.152*** -0.192*** -0.138*** -0.297*** -0.218*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.011) (0.0028) (0.0070) (0.0065) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.127***       
 (0.0045)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.112***       
 (0.0064)       
Pure domestic 
private 
0.150***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital
0.145***       
 (0.0052)       
Foreign 0.124***       
 (0.0048)       
Constant -0.545*** -0.856*** -0.552*** -0.754*** -0.350*** -0.561*** 0.355 
 (0.047) (0.084) (0.063) (0.15) (0.058) (0.089) (0.23) 
Observations 502321 38599 62636 11615 291850 31222 66399 
R2 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2612.83; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
996.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
928.63; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1239.27; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
954.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1738.15; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1184.28; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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